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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is properly based upon Rule 4
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and pursuant to §78-22(3) (j) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order signed and entered by the
Honorable Frank G. Noel on March 29, 1991, which clarified a
previous judgment and order regarding non-judicial foreclosure of
the property which was the subject of the litigation.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Were Defendants Ovard required by §78-37-1 Utah Code

Ann. (1953 as amended) to pursue the non-judicial foreclosure of
Plaintiffs' property as the second trust deed holders before
seeking a deficiency judgment against the Plaintiffs?
Standard of Review:
The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law and such conclusions of law are accorded no
particular deference but reviewed for correctness.

Ward v.

Richfield Cityr 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990).
2.

Should the Defendants' damages have been limited to the

difference between the fair market value of Plaintiffs' property
and the judgment awarded them on June 6, 1988, due to their
voluntary refusal to immediately pursue the non-judicial
foreclosure sale?
Standard of Review:

The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law and such conclusions of law are accorded no
particular deference but reviewed for correctness.

Ward v.

Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
§78-37-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) attached as
"Addendum."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

A judgment was rendered against the Plaintiffs in the

above-entitled action on June 6, 1988.
2.

(R. 210-215)

The terms of that judgment awarded Defendants

$40,600.50 and provided that, among other things, the property
which was the subject of that litigation be sold by a trustee's
sale and that Defendants be awarded a deficiency judgment after
crediting Plaintiffs with the fair market value of the property
on the date of sale.
3.

(R. 213)

The subject property was subsequently sold by

MountainWest Savings (the first trust deed holder) on September
1, 1989.

This sale occurred nearly 3 months after judgment was

awarded to the Defendants, giving them the right to immediately
sell the property after posting notice of the sale.

(R. 297,

Exhibit "A")
4.

At the time of the sale the subject property was worth

approximately $130,000 but it was sold by MountainWest for a bid
of approximately $107,000.

(R. 297, Exhibit
2

lf M

A , 324-325)

5.

Defendants were obligated under §78-37-1 Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended) to pursue the property first and yet they
failed to do so, despite having the ability and opportunity.

(R.

303-305)
6.

Rather, Defendants voluntarily delayed their sale and

allowed the bank to proceed with its foreclosure so that they
could bid on the property in that sale and still retain their
judgment against the Plaintiffs.
7.

(R. 347-350)

On August 7, 1990, Defendants filed a motion with the

trial court seeking entry of a deficiency judgment in the amount
of their judgment plus interest and attorney's fees.
subsequently withdrew that motion on August 31, 1990.

Defendants
(R. 289-

297, 329)
8.

Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Order Clarifying

Judgment which sought to have the trial judge limit the 1988
judgment to those amounts which exceed the fair market value of
the property at the time Defendants could have sold it but failed
to.

(R. 331-337)
9.

The trial judge ruled that his judgment did not require

the Defendants Ovard to proceed on a non-judicial foreclosure
sale under their trust deed and that Order is being appealed in
this matter.

(Order dated March 29, 1991)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Appellants/Sanders contend that §78-37-1 Utah Code Ann.
compelled the Ovards to pursue the property which secured their
3

judgment for satisfaction of that judgment.

The Ovards' failure

to execute upon the property should bar them from recovering from
the Sanders.
Alternatively, the Sanders argue that they are being
penalized by the Ovards7 failure to protect their security
interest in the property under §78-37-1. The Ovards7 judgment
should be reduced by the amount of equity which was lost when
MountainWest Savings foreclosed on their first trust deed.
INTRODUCTION
The facts in this case present an unusual situation for the
application of §78-37-1 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"One-Action Rule").

The cases interpreting this statute

generally involve second trust deed holders seeking to enforce a
contract after the property securing the obligation has been
lost.

In this case, the Defendants Ovard were awarded and

continue to hold a judgment against the Plaintiff Sanders.
The issue raised here concerns the application of the oneaction rule to the Ovard judgment which was initially secured by
the Sanders property.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM EXECUTING ON THE FULL
AMOUNT OF THEIR JUDGMENT WHERE THEY FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE ONE-ACTION RULE §78-37-1 UTAH CODE ANN.
When this action was initiated in July of 1985, the Sanders
sought and received, pursuant to stipulation, a permanent
injunction restraining the Ovards from foreclosing on the
4

property.

Two years later the Ovards filed a counterclaim

seeking a judicial foreclosure of the Sanders property.

On June

6, 1988, Judge Noel signed the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
which awarded the Ovards a money judgment in the amount of
$40,600.50,

A copy of that Judgment is attached hereto as

"Addendum".

In addition, that judgment affirmed the Ovards' lien

on the property and addressed the foreclosure on the property.
Paragraph 6 reads as follows:
Defendants shall be entitled to complete their
non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. All
requirements for such foreclosure are deemed to have
complied with except for the giving and posting of
notice of sale, which must still be accomplished by
Defendants. Pursuant to law applicable to trust deed
sales there shall be no redemption rights after sale,
and any deficiency shall be limited to the difference
between amounts owed by Plaintiffs to Defendants
hereunder, plus any subsequent allowable costs and
fees, and the fair market value of the Property at the
date of sale. In the event of a deficiency and an
action by Defendants therefor, such action may be
pursued by motion and evidentiary hearing in this
action without the necessity of Defendants commencing a
new and separate action. (emphasis added)
It is, and has been, the Sanders' position that Paragraph 6
contemplates that the Ovards promptly pursue the sale of the
property to satisfy all or a portion of their judgment.

Instead,

the Ovards were negotiating with MountainWest in an attempt to
purchase the property from them at their foreclosure sale.

In a

questionable procedure, MountainWest accepted a bid from Ovard at
the sale on June 6, 1988, subject to certain terms and

5

conditions.

Ovard was unable to meet those conditions and the

property was subsequently sold on September 1, 1988.
The Ovards then sought to execute on the full amount of
their judgment against the Sanders claiming that their security
in the property had been extinguished by the MountainWest
foreclosure.

Sanders objected on the basis that there was equity

in the property which would have satisfied the Ovard judgment and
the Ovards had a duty to pursue that remedy under §78-37-1.
The Ovards rely upon the exception to the one-action rule
which would relieve them from pursuing the security where it has
been lost or disposed of without any fault on their part.
Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah
1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Black. 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah
1980).

In response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify Judgment,

the Ovards argued that they fell within this exception as
MountainWest foreclosed upon the property and extinguished their
lien.
A.

The Ovards Failed to Protect Their Interest in the
Property,

The exception to the one-action rule applies only where it
is established that the security was lost without fault or
blameworthy conduct on the part of the creditor.

Lockhart Co. v.

Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1983); Utah
Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Black. 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980);
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Utah
6

1936).

The question of what types of conduct preclude a creditor

from seeking a deficiency was addressed in First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A. v, Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987) which
interpreted Utah law.

In his opinion, Judge Winder found that

recovery by a secured creditor was barred when:
(1) the creditor lost its lien because of failure to
record a notice of assignment of mortgage, Donaldson v.
Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 P. 799 (1897); (2) the creditor
released its lien because of its belief that there was
no equity in the collateral, Lockhart. supra; (3) the
creditor disposed of the collateral by private sale
under an illegal self-help remedy, Rein v. Callaway, 7
Idaho 634, 65 P. 63 (1901) (cited with approval by the
Utah Supreme Court in Black, supra); and (4) the
creditor lost its interest in the collateral because of
its failure to present a claim in a related probate
proceeding, Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v.
Thornton, 109 Cal. 427, 42 P. 447 (1895) (cited with
approval in Black).
Id, at 182 (cited with approval in City Consumer Services, Inc.
v, Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991))•

Sanders contends that the

Ovards' failure to pursue the remedy awarded to it by the trial
court is "blameworthy" and should bar them from seeking a
deficiency from the Sanders.
The trial judge recognized that there was equity in the
subject property which is why he allowed them to proceed with the
sale and limited any deficiency to the difference between the
fair market value of the property and any amounts still owing to
the Defendants,

Ovards' failure to protect their equity is

clearly blameworthy and should preclude them from pursuing
Sanders for a deficiency.

At a minimum, the Ovards should have
7

their judgment reduced by the difference between the fair market
value of the property when sold by MountainWest and the amount
paid by MountainWest.
B.

Sanders is Penalized by the Ovards' Failure to Protect
Their Interest in the Property,

The equities involved in this case demand that the Ovards be
barred from pursuing their judgment or, in the alternative, that
the judgment be reduced as set forth above.

Judge Noel awarded

the Ovards a money judgment and anticipated that they would
initially proceed against the real property to collect it.

The

equity was there until MountainWest foreclosed on the property in
September of 1988.

In fact, the Ovards were attempting to

purchase the property from MountainWest at approximately the same
time as judgment was entered.
In failing to protect their interest in the property, the
Ovards have effectively penalized Sanders in an amount equivalent
to the equity which existed in the property when it was sold by
MountainWest.

Had the Ovards bid unconditionally at the sale

conducted by MountainWest, Sanders would only be required to pay
to them a deficiency as contemplated by Judge Noel's Order.
Instead, the Ovards' inaction has allowed them to pursue Sanders
for the full amount of the judgment plus the interest which is
accruing thereon.

8

A similar issue was recently presented to this court in City
Consumer Services. Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991).
That case, however, is not dispositive of the present situation.
In Peters, as in most cases involving this statute, the issue is
whether the previously secured creditor can bring an action on
the underlying obligation.

Here, however, the Ovards had already

brought their action in a counterclaim, prevailed at trial,
received a money judgment and all but completed their
foreclosure.
CONCLUSION
The Sanders are asking this court for two alternative forms
of relief.

The first would be to find that, pursuant to §78-37-1

Utah Code Annotated and the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure,
the Ovards were obligated to pursue the security for their
judgment and as a result of their failure to do so, they should
be barred from recovering their judgment against the Sanders.
In the alternative, Sanders ask that this court reduce the
Ovard judgment by the difference between the amount paid by
MountainWest for the property of $107,000 and the fair market
value of the property of $130,000 at the time of sale on the
basis that equity demands that Sanders not be penalized for the
Ovards' decision to sit back and allow MountainWest to foreclose.

9

DATED this

day of November, 1991.
Respectfully Submitted,
GREEN & BERRY

,VJMq

REDEHICK N. GREE
EEN

IV. LUND
leys for P l a i n t i f f s /
j^llants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
COMES NOW Julie V. Lund, attorney for the
Plaintiffs/Appellants in the above-entitled action, and hereby
certifies that she has served the Defendants/Appellees with a
Brief of Appellants by mailing four (4) true and correct copies
thereof to Thomas N. Crowther of the firm of Parsons & Crowther,
attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, at 455 South 300 East, Suite
3 00, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, on this 2 6th day of November,

1991.
DATED this ZLp

day of November, 1991.
GREEN & BERRY

uM

IAAAA

FULIE V. LUND
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
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ADDENDUM

12

78-36-11

JUDICIAL CODE

(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may
be issued and enforced immediately
1087
78-36-11. T i m e for a p p e a l .
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the
judgment rendered
1953
Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — A b a n d o n e d
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial procesb, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tena n t has abandoned the premises.
IDSI

396

tion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not
re-rent the premises.
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and
has left personal property on the premises, the owner
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling,
store it ior the tenant, and recover actual moving and
storage costs from the tenant The owner shall make
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location
of the personal property; however, if the property has
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward
any amount the tenant owes Any money left over
from the sale of the property shall be handled as specified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this
act shall be in derogation of or alter the owners
rights under Chapter 3, Title 38
1986

78-36-12.

78-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tena n t from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days alter
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner t h a t
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1981
78-36-12.6. A b a n d o n e d p r e m i s e s — Retaking
and rerenting by o w n e r — Liability of
tenant — Personal property of tenant
left on premises.
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable.
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of
the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental
value, plus the difference between the fair rental
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-

CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1.
78-37-2
78-37-3
78-37-4
78-37-5
78-37-6
78-37-7
78-37-8
78-37-9

Form of action — J u d g m e n t — Special
execution
Deficiency judgment — Execution.
Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights
barred
Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys
Sales — When debt due in installments
Right of redemption — Sales by parcels
— Of land and water stock.
Repealed.
Restraining possessor from injuring
property.
Attorney fees.

78-37-1.

Form of action — J u d g m e n t — Special
execution.
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt
or the enforcement of any right secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the provisions of
law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or order of sale shall be issued for that purpose.
1963
78-37-2. Deficiency j u d g m e n t — Execution.
If it appears from the return of the officer making
the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and a balance still remains due, judgment theiefor must then
be docketed by the clerk and execution may be issued
for such balance as in other cases, but no general
execution shall issue until after the sale of the mortgaged property and the application of the amount realized as aforesaid.
19&3
78-37-3.

Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights
barred.
No person holding a conveyance from or under the
mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or having a
lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not appear o( record in the proper office at the time of the
commencement of the action, need be made a party to
such action, and the judgment therein rendered, and
the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive
against the party holding such unrecorded convey-

.Is,.*
H D.AV^l'^

G tS88
UKKJta Oist Court

Thomas N. Crowther - #0773
PARSONS & CROWTHER
Attorneys for Defendants
455 South Third East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-9865
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH D. SANDERS and CHERYL M.
SANDERS,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
FORECLOSURE

v,
MARTIN S. OVARD, REVA S. OVARD,
BEN r. OVARD, HELEN T. OVARD,
AND JAX HAYES PETTEY,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants,
v.
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M.
SANDERS, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
and INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA,

Civil No. C85-4313
Judge Noel

Counterdefendants.

The above entitled action came on regularly for trial on
October 26 and 27, 1987, before the Honorable Frank G. Noel,

- 1 -

Judge of the above-entitled court, sitting without a jury, with
David R. Olsen and Gary R. Henrie of the law firm of SUITTER,
AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON appearing as counsel for Plaintiffs,
and with Thomas N. Crowther of the law firm of PARSONS & CROWTHER
appearing as counsel for Defendants and with no appearance having
been made by or on behalf of Counterdefendants Utah State Tax
Commission, Salt Lake County and Insurance Company of North
America, with Defendants having stipulated to the dismissal of
Counterdef endants Utah State Tax Commission and Salt Lake County
and Defendants and Counterdefendant Insurance Company of North
America having stipulated as to issues between them.

Having

heard testimony of witnesses, having received and reviewed
exhibits, having heard arguments of counsel at trial and having
heard arguments of counsel at a hearing on February 12, 1988, on
Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, having taken the issues
and matters raised at trial and upon Defendant's Motion for
Attorney's Fees under advisement, the Court with the parties
agreement having personally viewed the property in question,
having heard arguments of Counsel on Plaintiff's objections to
Defendants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and
judgment and decree of foreclosure, and being now fully advised
in the premises and of the law and facts in this matter, and
having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:

Defendants1 claims a g a i n s t C o u n t e r d e f e n d a n t s

1.

Tax C o m m i s s i o n

and

Salt

Lake County

are

Utah

dismissed

State

without

prejudice.
2.
relief

Plaintiffs

a r e not e n t i t l e d

requested

heretofore

in

entered

their
by t h e

t o and a r e not awarded any

complaint,
Court

and

the

enjoining

injunction

Defendants

from

p u r s u i n g any f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s under t h e T r u s t Deed r e f e r r e d
in

Plaintiffs1

complaint

hereinbelow i d e n t i f i e d i s
3.

Defendants

are

Defendants1

entitled

to

and

are

which c o n s i s t s of

and $ 1 0 . 6 4 p e r day i n t e r e s t

from and a f t e r

costs,

together

interest

on s u c h

s t a t u t o r y judgment r a t e from and a f t e r
4.

Pursuant

Plaintiffs

to

that

as T r u s t o r s

certain

in favor

awarded

$14,285.54

October 26, 1987,
such

4, 1 9 8 7 , $ 2 , 0 0 0 a t t o r n e y ' s

with

date

to

real property l o c a t e d
particularly

total

amount

at

the

December 4, 1987.
Trust

Deed

of D e f e n d a n t s

as

executed

by

Beneficiaries
Entry

have a good and v a l i d l i e n upon c e r t a i n

i n S a l t Lake C o u n t y ,

described

and

f e e s and $508.51

and recorded November 8, 1982, in Book 5418 a t Page 1755 a s
No. 3 7 2 7 9 4 7 , D e f e n d a n t s

and

in t h e amount

$25,900 p r i n c i p a l ,

t o and i n c l u d i n g

December

hereby

j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y ,

a c c r u e d and u n p a i d i n t e r e s t

including

counterclaim

terminated.

judgment a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s ,
of $ 4 0 , 6 0 0 . 5 0 ,

and

to

in

S t a t e of U t a h ,

t h e T r u s t Deed and i n E x h i b i t

more
M M

A

attached hereto (the "Property") for payment of the amounts and
judgment referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph.
5.

Any claimed right, title or interest of Counterdefendant

Insurance Company of North America is subordinate and inferior to
the Trust Deed and Defendants1 interest in the Property.
6.

Defendants shall

be entitled

non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed.

to complete

their

All requirements for

such foreclosure are deemed to have complied with except for the
giving and posting of notice of sale, which must still be
accomplished by Defendants.

Pursuant to law applicable to trust

deed sales there shall be no redemption rights after sale, and
any deficiency shall be limited to the difference between amounts
owed by Plaintiffs to Defendants hereunder, plus any subsequent
allowable costs and fees, and the fair market value of the
Property at the date of sale.

In the event of a deficiency and

an action by Defendants therefor, such action may be pursued by
motion and evidentiary hearing in this action without the
necessity of Defendants commencing a new and separate action.

- 4 -

•^VM^—

DATED J&ay ($_,

1988.
BY THE COURT:

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ATTEST

SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG
& HANSON

H. DIXON HINPlIhY
By

/

By.

'diu-L

tCau c

-
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-

hiL^n M.

EXHIBIT "A"
Beginning at a point 716.85 feet North 0°23 l 08" East from the
East quarter corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 76°11,02"
West 186.90 feet; thence North 0°23 f 08" East 202.5 feet; thence
North 76 o ll f 02 , , East 186.90 feet; thence South 0°23 f 08 n West
202.5 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with a 35 foot wide right of way connecting to 13800
South Street, and subject to a 35 foot wide right of way adjacent
to and parallel with the West line of subject property described
as follows:
A 35 foot wide strip of land, the center line of which begins
299.95 feet North 89°39,27M West from the East quarter corner of
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian and runs thence North 0°23l08,! East 311.30 feet; thence
North 16°51 , 02" East 332.85 feet; thence North 0°23 , 08" East
200.88 feet.

